1. Introduction
Dividend payout policy has been the primary puzzling factor in the economics of corporate finance since the work of Black (1976). The dividend literature has primarily relied on two lines of hypothesis: signaling and agency cost. The cash flow hypothesis asserts that insiders have more information about firms' future cash flow than outsiders do, and they have incentive to signal that information to outsiders.
Institutional Details
Large shareholders, like other emerging market economies, characterize Indian corporate firms' ownership structure. Majority control gives the largest shareholder incentive and control over key decisions, like dividend payout. The dominance of large shareholders may affect the dividend payout in several ways. There have been changes in the taxation policy for dividend during the sample period, which gives us an opportunity to test the tax-preference theory and its implications for the dividend payout in case of an emerging market economy, India. India operates a classical company tax system in which companies are taxed separately from the investors receiving the profits in form of dividends.
Data and Variable Construction
Data
The firm level panel data for our study is primarily obtained from the corporate database (PROWESS) maintained by Center for Monitoring the Indian Economy (CMIE). The data used in the analysis consists of all manufacturing firms listed on the Bombay Stock Exchange (BSE), for which we could get their historical share holding pattern along with the dividend payout ratio and other explanatory variables used in the study. We confine our analysis to BSE listed firms only because all the listed firms are required to follow the norms set by SEBI for announcing the financial accounts. The BSE also has the second largest number of domestic quoted companies on any stock exchange in the world after NYSE, and more quoted companies than either the London or the Tokyo stock exchange.
Empirical Analysis
This section is divided in two sub-sections: sub-section 1 presents the empirical model. The descriptive statistics and regression results are presented in sub- section 2. Sub-section 3 analyses the endogeneity of ownership and in sub-section 4, we present results of some sensitivity analysis.
Conclusion
Our paper offers an empirical examination of the agency theory explanation for the distribution of dividends policy in India, especially, analyzing the relationship between the ownership structure, corporate governance, and dividend payout using a large panel of Indian corporate firms over 1994-2000. To the best of our knowledge, it is the first attempt to use the well-established dividend payout models to examine the impact of ownership structures on dividend payout policies in context of an emerging market economy, India.
References
- Bhat, Ramesh, and I. M. Pandey, 1994, Dividend decision: A Study of Managers' Perceptions, Decision 21, 67–86.
- Bhattacharya, Sudipto, 1979, Imperfect information, dividend policy, and "the bird in the hand" fallacy, Bell Journal of Economics 10, 259–270.
- Black, Fisher, 1976, The dividend puzzle, Journal of Portfolio Management 2, 72–77. Brennan, Michael J., and Anjan V. Thakor, 1990.
- Demsetz, Harold and Belen Villalonga, 2001, Ownership Structure and Corporate Performance, Journal of Corporate Finance 7(3): 209-33.
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